The Bally Shoes-Personal Computer Case

ADORACION FARINAS-LOT vs. ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ, SR.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 26 2000.

A.C. No. 4922 (Adoracion Farinas-Lot vs Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr.)

On July 2, 1998, complainant Wed with the Supreme Court a Letter-Complaint1 Rollo, p. 1.for disciplinary action against her lawyer, respondent herein, for alleged misrepresentation as to the filing fees and other amounts due in connection with two cases handled by respondent for complainant.

Concerning the first case, Civil Case No. 2444-97-C, 2 Entitled "Adoracion Lot-Ardina v. Spouses Mamilcar Rasimo and Divina Rasimo, for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction filed with the RTC-Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34.complainant alleged that sometime in July of 1997, respondent requested from her the amount of P 112,000.00 to be paid as filing fees in the case. Respondent issued a receipt 3 Annex "A" to the Letter Complaint, Rollo, p.4.that he received the amount of P 112,000.00 from complainant. However, complainant later discovered that the actual filing fees amounted to only P965.00. Hence, she requested for the return of the difference of P111,035.00. Upon failure of respondent to return said amount, she instituted the present complaint.

In his Comment and/or Answer, 4 Rollo, pp. 17-20.respondent countered that the receipt for the filing fee was actually prepared by complainant who placed the higher amount for the purpose of claiming a tax deduction. Furthermore, he said that the P111,035.00 difference was actually part of the acceptance fee of respondent, which was at an agreed amount of P150,000.00.

Complainant claimed, however, that the amount of P112,000.00 could not have been part of the attorney’s fees because she already gave respondent a second hand personal computer and a pair of Bally shoes as payment for his services in Civil Case No. 2444-97-C.

Respondent admitted receiving the second hand personal computer with printer but claimed that it was not in relation to Civil Case No. 2444-97-C, but in connection with the assistance extended by respondent to complainant in the canvassing of votes of the homeowner’s association. Respondent categorically denied having received the pair of B ally shoes as part of his acceptance fee, and insisted that he does not receive payment in kind for his services.

The second case involved a civil case for annulment of marriage. 5 Filed before the RTC-Calaxnba, Laguna, Branch 31.Complainant claimed that respondent requested the amounts of P25,000.00 and P11,400.00 as payment of filing fees with the Office of the Solicitor General and for publication purposes respectively. However, complainant later discovered that no filing fees are required in the OSG, and that no publication was ever made. Hence, complainant likewise demanded the return of said amounts but respondent refused to do so.

Respondent denied requesting the amounts of P25,000.00 and P11,400.00 as filing fees with the OSG or for purposes of publication. He claimed that he only received the amount of P3 5,000.00 as attorney’s fee in connection with the marriage annulment case.

In a Resolution dated November 9, 1998, 6 Rollo, p. 60.the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

On January 29, 2000, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that:

(1) In the first case, the complaint having been substantiated, respondent should be ordered to refund to complainant the amount of P111,035.00, which is the difference between the amount received per receipt and the actual filing fees paid. In the event of respondent’s refusal to do so, respondent should be reprimanded for his act of misrepresentation concerning said filing fees.

(2) In the second case, concerning monies given to respondent in connection with the marriage annulment case, complainant failed to substantiate her allegations that the same was given for filing fees with the OSG or for purposes of publication. Nor was it established that it was respondent who issued the receipt. The IBP found as acceptable the explanation of respondent that said amounts were paid as attorney’s fees, hence the complaint in this regard was without basis.

We concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner as approved by IBP Board of Governors, with the modification that even after he refunds the difference of P111,035.00 he should still be subject of reprimand.

Worthy of note, respondent’s issuance and use of a false receipt for the payment of filing fees clearly violates Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "{a} lawyer shall not counsel nor abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Respondent is therefore exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to abide strictly with his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. In language too plain to be misunderstood, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Such conduct which could prejudice not only private persons but also the government tax collection effort ought not to be condoned nor abetted by a member of the bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby orders respondent to return the amount of P111,035.00 to complainant. Moreover, respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. is hereby REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense complained of will be dealt with more severely in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS

Clerk of Court

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SAMMY RAMOS Y DALERE , Accused Appellant.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172470, April 08, 2008]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SAMMY RAMOS Y DALERE , Accused Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] dated 10 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00003 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gubat, Sorsogon, Branch 54, finding appellant Sammy D. Ramos guilty of four (4) counts of rape but acquitted him of the other 46 charges. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and to pay the victim AAA[3] the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages, for every conviction.

Appellant was charged under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC with 50 counts of rape spanning the period of 18 January 1992 to 28 March 1992 against his 13-year old daughter.

The four charges which are the subject matter of this appeal were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 1770, 1771, 1772 and 1831. The four similarly-worded Informations, except for the dates of commission, contained the following allegations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 1770

That on or about the night of January18, 1992, at Barangay Cogon, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own 12-year old daughter, AAA against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.[4]
The three other Informations alleged that the rape was committed on 19 January 1992 (Criminal Case No. 1771);[5] on 20 January 1992 (Criminal Case No. 1772);[6] and on 28 March 1992 (Criminal Case No. 1831).[7]

Upon arraignment on 12 February 1993, appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each count of rape. [8] Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.[9]

From AAA’s testimony, the prosecution was able to establish the following:

AAA was born out of wedlock on 5 October 1978 to appellant Sammy Ramos and BBB in Consuelo, Santa Marcela, Kalinga, Apayao.[10] She grew up in the custody of her mother who was living with her maternal grandparents in Ballesteros, Cagayan.[11] It was there that she studied and finished her elementary education from Grade I until Grade V.[12] Sometime in May of 1991 and after finishing Grade V, she stowed away from her maternal grandparent’s house because her uncle attempted to sexually molest her.[13] Wanting to experience the love and protection of a father, she proceeded to the hometown of her father in Sta. Marcela, Kalinga, Apayao. There, she stayed with her paternal grandmother for a week until she was fetched by her father’s live-in-partner, Maribel Serayda. Maribel Serayda brought AAA to appellant who was then working in Cogon, Gubat, Sorsogon. It was the first time she met her father who worked there as a heavy equipment operator in a construction company allegedly owned by his uncle. While assigned in Sorsogon, AAA’s father lived with his live-in partner in one of the barracks for the company employees. When she arrived, AAA stayed with the couple in the barracks. Appellant allowed AAA to continue her studies and she was enrolled in Grade VI in June 1991. Towards the end of 1991, however, Maribel Serayda left because she could no longer bear the physical abuse done to her by the appellant.[14] From that time, AAA was left alone with appellant in the barracks. The dwelling had two bedrooms which they separately occupied.[15]

On 18 January 1992, appellant committed the first act of rape. When AAA went to sleep, at about 3:00 a.m., clad in a duster and a panty underneath, she woke up finding appellant on top of her and holding her breast.[16] He covered her mouth with a blanket and told her not to tell anybody or he would kill her. She tried to extricate herself from the appellant, but the latter proved to be too strong for her. He then removed her panty and inserted his penis into her vagina.[17] Upon realizing that her struggle to repel appellant from satisfying his bestial desire was coming to naught, AAA began to cry. Appellant switched on the light in the room and turned on the radio. It was from the radio that AAA heard the exact time of the first sexual assault.[18]

On the night of 19 January 1992, appellant repeated what he did to AAA the day before. He again forced himself into her and threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody of the incident. [19]

The following night, 20 January 1992, appellant committed the third rape at the same place. He again stayed on top of her and had sexual intercourse against her will.[20] As in the previous occassions, she did not report the same because she was afraid of him.[21]

The molestation continued nightly from 21 January to 28 March 1992, except from February 1 to 14 of 1992, when appellant was assigned in Casiguran.[22]

The last rape incident, which, as mentioned earlier, occurred on 28 March 1992 coincided with the graduation exercises of AAA. During the ceremony, AAA was accompanied by the female secretary of the construction firm named Deding. The graduation program ended at around 9 p.m., after which AAA and Deding went to the barracks to eat. Appellant did not eat with the two. When Deding left, AAA went to sleep. She was again awakened from her sleep when she felt appellant was on top of her and ravished her against her will.[23]

On 4 April 1992, she related these harrowing experiences to Nelly Enaje who helped her escape from the claws of the appellant.[24] Three days after, Nelly Enaje brought her to Danilo Enaje, the Barangay Captain of Cogon.[25] Danilo Enaje accompanied the victim to the police station. The policemen had her undergo a physical examination at the Gubat District Hospital under Dr. Edna Gorospe who disclosed that the victim’s hymen had old lacerations at various areas and that the labia minora had abrasion which means that the victim could have been raped several times before she was examined.[26]

AAA explained that aside from fact that she was afraid of the threat of the appellant, it took her some time to leave appellant and to report the abuses done to her because she had no other relatives in Sorsogon and that she wanted to finish her schooling which was then in its final stage.[27]

The defense presented its only witness, the appellant, who denied having committed the charges hurled against him. He claimed that he came to Cogon, Gubat, Sorsogon, in 1991 to work with a construction company as road roller operator. The victim, whom he admitted to be his daughter, stayed with her in a bunk house provided for them by his employer. He testified that sometime in 1992, AAA, together with a friend, took his money which was kept inside the bunk house and ran away from Cogon.[28] He reported the incident to the barangay captain of Cogon. He looked for AAA in Abuyog, Irosin, Sorsogon and in Manila, but his search was in vain. Upon his return to Cogon, he learned that AAA and her friend were both in Abuyog. He was later called by the mayor of Gubat, Sorsogon, and was put behind bars.[29]

The RTC, in a decision dated 30 August 1998, convicted the appellant of 4 counts of rape in Criminal Cases No. 17170, 1771, 1772 and 1831 which were committed on 18 January, 19 January, 20 January, and 28 March 1992, respectively. The RTC, however, acquitted appellant of the other 46 rape charges against him for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Sammy Ramos y Dalere GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on four (4) counts in Criminal Case Nos. 1770,1771,1772 and 1831, and hereby sentences him to RECLUSION PERPETUA for each and every count of the crime committed, with all the accessory penalties of the law; and to pay AAA the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) for moral damages, for each of the four felonies of rape, subject to the provisions of Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

The other cases against the accused as stated above, are hereby DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[30]
In its decision dated 10 February 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment is rendered AFFIRMING the decision appealed from and DISMISSING the appeal.[31]
Hence, the instant recourse.

In his brief, the appellant assigns the following errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MULTIPLE RAPE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD HER CLOTHES ON DURING THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TIMID AND PASSIVE CONDUCT AND ACTUATION OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUPPOSED SEXUAL ASSAULT ON HER CAST SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Appellant expresses a strong concern over the victim’s account of the alleged rape incidents. He claims that the rapes could not have been committed because the offended party had her clothes on all the time when the said incidents took place. He likewise points out that the victim’s timid and passive conduct during and after every incident of defloration runs counter to the normal reaction of a rape victim since it is unnatural for a victim to continue living with her tormentor and not to extricate herself from said abusive environment. Moreover, he insists that his conviction of four counts of rape is unwarranted because the victim merely gave general statements that she was raped, but she failed to disclose sufficient details to substantiate her allegations.

In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles, namely: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[32]

Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.[33] In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with.[34] If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof; otherwise, he should be acquitted of the crime.[35]

In this case, upon assessing the victim’s testimony, the RTC found her credible, thus:
In the case at bar, AAA did not only say she had been raped, she described in detail how she had been sexually abused by her own natural father and the testimony of the private complainant bears the earmarks of truth. No woman especially one who is of tender age would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit punished.

x x x x

On the basis of substantial evidence of culpability which the defense of denial and alibi failed to overcome, this Court is persuaded into finding and holding, as it hereby finds and holds that on four (4) occasions: (1) in the early morning of January 18, 1992; (2) in the evening of January 19, 1992; (3) in the evening of January 20, 1992; and (4) in the evening of March 28, 1992 in Cogon, Gubat, Sorsogon.[36]
This Court itself has assiduously scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and like the RTC, it finds the victim’s testimony of the incident forthright and straightforward, reflective of an honest and realistic account of the tragedy that befell her. She narrated the first and the second rape incidents in this manner:
Q: Now, at the initial stage of the hearing you mentioned that your stepmother by the name of Maribel left your father in December 1991. After she left your father, who was with you together with your father in Cogon?


A: Only the two of us.


Q: Now, you were then staying in that barracks you mentioned last time-the barracks of the 642 Construction at Cogon?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: Can you still describe to us that barracks or your place of residence?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: How many bedrooms were there in that barracks?


A: Two.


Q: Those are bedrooms?


A: Yes, sir.


x x x x


Q: After Maribel, your stepmother, had left, you and your father were using that one room as your bedroom?


A: No, sir. I was staying in one room and he was staying in the other room.


x x x x


Q: While you were alone in your room on January 18, 1992, while sleeping then, do you know of any incident that happened in your person?


A: There was.


Q: What was it, AAA?


A: I was touched “ginalaw� by my Papa.


Q: When you said “Ginalaw ako ng Papa ko,� what do you mean, AAA?


A: He abused me.


Q: In what manner?


A: (At this juncture the witness is crying and wiping her tears with her handkerchief.) I cannot tell of any manner why somebody entered my room while I was sleeping. And then, I sensed that somebody was on top of me. I tried to extricate myself but he was so strong. He held my breasts with his two hands and then covered my mouth with a blanket.


Q: And after your mouth was covered by the blanket, what happened next?


A: He told me that if I will tell somebody I would be killed.


Q: Have you recognized that somebody who placed himself on top of you?


A: His voice.


Q: And whose voice was that?


A: That of my Papa.


x x x x


Q: After your father placed a blanket in your mouth, what did he do, if any?


A: His organ was in me.


Q: In going to bed that night of January 18, 1992, what were you wearing?


A: A duster and panty.


Q: You said a while ago that your father inserted his organ, where was it inserted?


A: Into my vagina.


x x x x


Q: You said a while ago that your Papa was able to insert his organ in your vagina. What did you do when your father inserted his organ in your vagina?


A: I was crying.


Q: Why were you crying then? Or why did you cry?


A: Because he was doing that to me.


Q: And when your father was doing this act to you, was your room where you were situated not lighted with any kind of light for that matter?


A: There was.


Q: Where was the light situated?


A: Inside.


Q: What room?


A: Both rooms were lighted.


x x x x


Q Was it lighted when this thing was done to you by your Papa?


A: No. sir.


Q: Do you know who switched off that light?


A: Before I went to sleep I usually switched off the light.


Q: So, we are certain that at the time this thing was happening, the electric light was off then?


A: Yes, sir.


x x x x


Q: Do you recall what hour in the night that this thing happened on January 18, 1992?


A: Early morning.


Q: Why can you say that it was early morning?


A: Because after he used me he switched on the light and he switched on the radio to have music. And in the course of the music I heard the time.


Q: And what time was it that you heard on the radio?


A: About 3:00 o’clock.


x x x x


Q: In the night of January 19, who was with you in that barracks which you considered as your residence?


A: My Papa.


Q: Do you recall of any untoward incident again that happened in your person on the night of January 19?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: What was that again?


A: He again raped me.


Q: Why can you say that he raped you again? What was done to your person?


A: He repeated what he had done to me before.


Q: And what did you do also after he was repeating the act he had done to you?


A: I was fighting and crying.


Q: And what did he do after he had done that thing to you again on the night of January 19? What did he do next?


A: He again told me not to tell anybody because he is going to kill me.[37]


The victim recounted the third rape in this fashion:


Q: On January 20, 1992, in the evening of said date, do you recall where were you?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: Where were you then situated?


A: Inside the house.


Q: What were you doing on the night of January 20, 1992?

A: Sleeping.


Q: While you were sleeping, do you recall of any untoward incident that happened to you personally?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: What was that, AAA?


A: I was abused by my father.


Q: When you say abused, what do you mean?


A: My father laid on top of me.


Q: And what did you do next after laying on top of you?


A: I was crying and I was defenseless because he was strong.


Q: Why did you cry then?


A: Because something had been done to me.


Q: Please be candid and frank with us. What was done to you by accused Ramos?


A: I was raped.


Q: And what did you do when this accused raped you on the night of January 20?


A: I could do nothing, except to obey because I was afraid.


Q: Before he put himself on top of you, do you recall what he had done to you?


A: There is.


Q: What was that?


A: My mouth was shut and then both of my hands were held.[38]


As to the fourth rape, the victim testified:


Q: Now, if you can still remember, Madam witness, when was it that he last raped you?


A: March 28, 1991.


x x x x


Q: And, according to you, March 28 was the last time that your father raped you?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: When was the graduation exercises in the elementary school where you enrolled in 1992?


A: The 28th


x x x x


Q: Alright, you said that the graduation exercises was on March 28, 1992. Have you participated in that graduation exercises?


A: Yes, sir.[39]


Q: x x x My question is, what time was the graduation exercises held in that school?


A: In the afternoon.


Q: Please tell us whether your father, Sammy Ramos, attended the graduation exercises?


A: No, sir.


Q: If any, do you have some companion to attend the graduation exercises?


A: I have.


Q: Please tell us the name?


A: Deding.


Q: Who is this Deding?


A: She is the secretary of 642 Construction.


x x x x


Q: Do you still recall what time was the closing exercises finished?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: What time was it?


A: 9:00 o’clock in the evening.


Q: And after 9:00 o’clock in the evening, where did you go next?


A: I was accompanied back to Cogon.


Q: By whom?


A: The secretary of 642.


Q: Of course you reached your place in Cogon in that barracks where you and your father were residing?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: What did you do next after reaching that place from your graduation?


A: We ate.


Q: How about Deding?


A: She ate with us.


Q: And after eating, where did she go, if any?


A: She returned home at Gubat.


Q: And how about you, what did you do next?


A: I was left at the barracks.


Q: And what did you do when you were left at the barracks?


A: I went to sleep.


Q: By the way, where was your father, Sammy Ramos, when you and Deding were eating that night?


A: He was at the barracks.


Q: Did he eat with you?


A: He did not.


Q: What happened while you were sleeping that night, Madam witness?


A: I felt that he was on top of me and he repeated his abusing.


Q: When you said he, to whom do you refer?


A: My father.


Q: And how did he repeat the act against you?


A: He placed his personal organ inside my personal organ.


Q: What did you do when he was doing this act to you?


A: I was crying but I could not fight because he was strong.[40]


From the foregoing, the prosecution adequately established in graphic detail that during the incidents in question, AAA stayed with the appellant in the barracks of the 642 Construction in Cogon, Gubat, Sorsogon and that appellant ravished his 13-year old daughter in four different dates, i.e., in the early morning of 18 January 1992, during the nights of 19 January 1992, 20 January 1992 and 28 March 1992. In all these deflorations, the victim resisted the bestial acts of the appellant, but the same proved fruitless as the latter was far stronger than her. Medical findings revealed that the victim’s hymen had old lacerations at various areas and that her labia minora had abrasion which are consistent with her claim that she was molested. Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, what appellant could only muster is a barefaced denial. Unfortunately for the appellant, his defense is much too flaccid to stay firm against the weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[41] Between the self-serving testimony of appellant and the positive identification by the eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence.[42]

Appellant’s assertion that the sexual assault against the victim could not have been consummated because AAA was wearing her underwear every time appellant attempted on her chastity is not supported by evidence. During trial it was revealed by the victim that in all those four rape incidents, appellant removed her panty before inserting his penis and put it back after he satisfied his filthy desire. This was clarified by the victim when the trial court raised some clarificatory questions on this matter, thus:
Court: (to witness)


Q: Counsel for the accused had been using the word intercourse, rape and sexual intercourse and you were answering “yes�. My question is: why is it that when you were asked by counsel for the accused that while the accused was on top of you holding your hands and his two feet over your two feet, your underwear were still intact, thereafter he left you and you said “yes�. Do you mean to tell the Court that he left you without doing anything against your feminity?


A: There is.


Q: What was that?


A: I was abused.


Q: What do you mean by “abused�?


A: His own was placed inside me.


Q: But you said your father left with your panty still intact. How could it be possible?


x x x x


A: After he used me he put on again my panty.


Q: You mean he removed your panty before he used you and after using you he put it back, is that what you mean?


A: Yes, sir.


Q: And that is being done by the accused every time he used you?

A: Yes, sir.[43] (Emphasis supplied.)


Appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her deportment which was not that of an “outraged woman robbed of her honor.� It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the victim was only a naive thirteen (13)-year old child when the depredation happened to her. Since childhood, she had been longing to experience the love and protection of a father. When she finally found herself under the refuge of her father, it brought the bliss of an answered prayer. This idyllic experience, however, remained a fleeting episode because the person who should shield her from harm and evil was the very same person who wrought malady upon her. Such must be a startling occurrence for her. Behavioral psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly.[44] Their reactions to harrowing incidents may not be uniform.[45] AAA’s conduct of staying with her tormentor and her failure to prevent the repetition of the rape incident should not be taken against her. She was too disturbed and too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly acts inflicted on her by the appellant. Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation.[46] It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances.[47] The range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus.[48] It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims. Certainly, the Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been violated.[49] This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Indeed, different people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience.[50] It would be insensitive to expect the victim to act with equanimity and to have the courage and the intelligence to disregard the threat made by the appellant. When a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. This is especially true in this case since AAA was repeatedly threatened by appellant if ever she would tell anybody about the rape incidents. The threat instilled enormous fear in her such that she failed to take advantage of any opportunity to escape from the appellant. Also, as AAA explained, she withstood her father’s lechery and stayed with him despite what he did because she wanted to complete her studies until 28 March 1992 when she graduated. Besides, getting away from appellant was a task extremely difficult for a 13-year old girl, alone with the predator in a far-away place, motherless, without any relative to turn to in an hour of need, penniless, and uninformed in the ways of the world. In fact, it was only when a Good Samaritan crossed her path that the victim was able to report to the authorities about her father’s spiteful deeds.

As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.[51] It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue.[52] Her hesitation may be due to her youth, the moral ascendancy of the ravisher, and the latter’s threats against her. In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. Such reaction is typical of a thirteen-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.

Appellant’s allegation that the complaints for rapes were prompted by the victim’s hatred of the appellant for abandoning her is bereft of any basis. The victim even during her tender years had been looking for her father. She was, in fact, delighted when she saw her father for the first time in May of 1991. If AAA at all nurtured ill-will against her father, it was because he, instead of acting as protector of his daughter, defiled her. Assuming arguendo that AAA harbored hatred against appellant, it would be unlikely for a 13-year old girl to fabricate such story. This Court has held that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.[53] It is highly improbable for an innocent girl, who is very naïve to the things of this world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her family. Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible.[54] The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. [55]

In sum, the Court finds that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, committed no error in giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution and finding appellant guilty of the charges. The Court has long adhered to the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.[56] In rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not.[57] This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.[58] This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court.[59]

As to the penalty imposed, the RTC correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua for each count. Note that the rapes complained of in this case took place on 18 January 1992 to 28 March 1992, prior to the restoration of the death penalty for cases of qualified rape by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law. The death penalty law took effect only on 31 December 1993.[60] As thus correctly found by the RTC, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, is applicable. The rapes committed by appellant are, therefore, simple, penalized by reclusion perpetua.

The RTC ordered the appellant to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, such award is in order.[61] However, the award of moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each count of rape is modified and increased to P50,000.00 conformably with the recent pronouncement of the Court.[62]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 February 2006, affirming the Decision dated 30 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Gubat, Sorsogon, finding appellant Sammy Ramos y Dalere GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 4 counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each count and ordering him to pay the victim P50,000.00 for each count as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED. The award of moral damages for each of the four rapes in favor of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., Assigned as Special Member.


[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L Guariña III with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-9.

[2] Penned by Judge Haile F. Frivaldo.

[3] Under Republic Act No. 9262 also known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004� and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members are withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect the victim’s privacy.

[4] CA rollo, p. 42.

[5] Id. at 44.

[6] Id. at 46.

[7] Id. at 84.

[8] Records, p. 60.

[9] Id. at 88.

[10] Id. at 233.

[11] TSN, 7 October 1993, p. 8.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 9.

[14] TSN, 13 October 1994, p. 9.

[15] TSN, 20 January 1994, p. 9.

[16] Id. at 10.

[17] Id. at 17.

[18] Id. at 19.

[19] Id. at 21-22.

[20] TSN, 12 May 1994, p. 8.

[21] Id.

[22] TSN, 20 January 1994, p. 8.

[23] TSN, 30 June 1994, p. 5.

[24] Id.

[25] TSN, 12 May 1994, p.

[26] TSN, 8 June 1995, pp. 19-21.

[27] TSN, 26 January 1995, p. 7.

[28] TSN, 16 April 1998, pp. 14-15.

[29] Id. at 7.

[30] Records, p. 324.

[31] Rollo, p. 8.

[32] People v. Orquina, 439 Phil. 359, 365-366 (2002).

[33] People v. Quijada, 378 Phil. 1040, 1047 (1999).

[34] Id.

[35] People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44, 53 (2000).

[36] Records, pp. 322-324.

[37] TSN, 20 January 1994, pp. 8-22.

[38] TSN, 12 May 1994, pp. 7-9.

[39] TSN, 20 January 1994, pp. 22-23.

[40] TSN, 30 June 1994, pp. 2-5.

[41] People v. Morales, 311 Phil. 279, 288 (1995).

[42] People v. Baccay, 348 Phil. 322, 327 (1998).

[43] TSN, 26 January 1995, pp. 13-14.

[44] People v. Buenviaje, 408 Phil. 342, 352 (2001).

[45] Id.

[46] People v. Remoto, 314 Phil. 432, 444-445 (1995).

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 326 (2004).

[50] Id.

[51] People v. Balmoria, 398 Phil. 669, 675 (2000).

[52] Id.

[53] People v. Palaña, 429 Phil. 293, 303 (2002).

[54] People v. Hinto, 405 Phil. 683, 693 (2001).

[55] Id.

[56] People v. Dagpin, 400 Phil. 728, 739 (2000).

[57] People v. Digma, 398 Phil. 1008, 1016 (2000).

[58] People v. Cula, 385 Phil. 742, 752 (2000).

[59] People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 849 (2003).

[60] The imposition of the Death Penalty has been prohibited pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines� which took effect immediately after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation, namely Malaya and Manila Times, on 29 June 2006 in accordance with Section 5 thereof.

[61] People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.

[62] Id.

TEOFILA ILAGAN-MENDOZA and ROSARIO ILAGAN URCIA, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALATAGAN RURAL BANK, INC., GEMINIANO T. NOCHE, as President

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 171374, April 08, 2008]

TEOFILA ILAGAN-MENDOZA and ROSARIO ILAGAN URCIA, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALATAGAN RURAL BANK, INC., GEMINIANO T. NOCHE, as President of Calatagan Rural Bank, and REMEDIOS DE CLARO and EDMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, as Sheriffs, Respondents.

Spouses ALBERTO URCIA and ROSARIO ILAGAN URCIA, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALATAGAN RURAL BANK, INC., GEMINIANO T. NOCHE, as President of Calatagan Rural Bank, and REMEDIOS DE CLARO and EDMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, as Sheriffs, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, with petitioners praying for the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 19 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 56688 and affirming the Decision[2] dated 3 October 1996 of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas which, in turn, dismissed Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 for lack of merit.

The following are the factual antecedents:

Petitioners are Teofila Ilagan-Mendoza (Teofila) and Rosario Ilagan-Urcia (Rosario), daughters of the late Estanislao Ilagan (Estanislao); and Alberto (Alberto) Urcia, Rosario’s husband.

The respondent Calatagan Rural Bank, Inc. (CRBI) filed on 9 July 1986 with the Sheriff’s Office two Applications for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135 (as amended by Act No. 4110), for petitioners’ unpaid loans, to wit:
(a) a Real Estate Mortgage covered by the following properties, to wit: TCT No. 11234, TCT No. 8465, TCT No. 14493, and TCT No.18772; and allegedly executed on 19 August 1974 by Teofila in favor of CRBI;[3] and

(b) a Real Estate Mortgage covered by property under TCT No. 31345, executed by Alberto, with Teofila as co-maker, to secure a P10,000.00 loan obtained by Alberto on 23 July 1985, maturing on 19 April 1986.[4]
On 20 August 1986, siblings Teofila and Rosario instituted Special Civil Action No. 1701 before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, while spouses Alberto and Rosario instituted Special Civil Action No. 1702 before the same court, both for injunction and damages, with an application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction, against respondents CRBI, CRBI President Geminiano Noche (Noche), and Sheriffs Remedios de Claro and Edmundo Rodriguez of the Batangas RTC, assailing CRBI’s Applications for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages referred to in the preceding paragraph, and seeking to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Special Civil Action Nos. 1701 and 1702 were consolidated by the RTC.

In Special Civil Action No. 1701,[5] Teofila and Rosario identified three crop loans obtained by their father, the late Estanislao, from CRBI in the amounts of P85,000.00, P75,000.00 and P25,000.00.[6] These loans, covered by a promissory note executed by and between Estanislao and CRBI, were secured by several Real Estate Mortgages[7] over the properties registered with the Registry of Deeds Batangas and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 11234, 8465, 14493, and 18772, with Estanislao Ilagan, married to Leocadia Mercado, as mortgagors and CRBI as mortgagee.

Estanislao was required to sign and submit a Deed of Assignment of all his sugar produce in favor of CRBI, as payment for the loans.[8] CRBI received the proceeds from Estanislao’s sugar produce which it applied to his loans. Teofila and Rosario contend that the records of the two sugar centrals, Central Azucarera Don Pedro (CADP) and Balayan Sugar Central, Inc. (BSCI), reveal that sufficient payment had been made on the loans by Estanislao by 1979, but no document was executed to cancel the mortgages securing the same. Estanislao passed away on 23 August 1983. It is important to note that the petition also stated that Estanislao was required to sign promissory notes in blank for the renewal of the unpaid balances of the original loans, which procedure was followed after Estanislao died on August 1983, but this time thru Teofila. Thereafter, Teofila suspected overpayment of the loans and demanded an accounting from CRBI but the latter refused, constraining her and her sister Rosario to file an administrative case against the bank with the Central Bank of the Philippines. At the time of filing of the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgages, CRBI allegedly owed Teofila an outstanding amount representing the proceeds from the sugar produce for the years 1980 to 1986.

On the other hand, in Special Civil Action No. 1702,[9] spouses Alberto and Rosario Urcia admitted that Alberto obtained two commodity loans from CRBI, one for P10,000.00 and another for P8,200.00. Alberto stated that to cover said loans, promissory notes and trust receipts were allegedly signed by him in blank, with Teofila as co-maker. The P10,000.00 loan was covered by a promissory note dated 23 July 1985, which was to become due and payable on 19 April 1986; while the loan for P8,200.00 was covered by a promissory note dated 23 December 1985 to mature on 19 September 1986. The said loans were secured by a real estate mortgage on the house and lot of Alberto and Rosario, covered by TCT No. 31345 registered in the Registry of Deeds of Batangas. Believing that the loans had been fully paid, Alberto asked for an accounting thereof, which CRBI ignored, hence, he sought the aid of the Central Bank. The CRBI further holds sugar quedans in the name of Rosario, Alberto’s wife, and such sugar quedans, if negotiated, can fully answer for whatever outstanding amount they may still owe CRBI.

Purportedly in retaliation to their demands for accounting and their seeking recourse with the Central Bank, CRBI filed a criminal complaint for libel and a civil action for damages against petitioners; an administrative charge against Alberto and Rosario; and the assailed applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.[10]

The RTC issued a TRO effective until 9 September 1986. The auction sale of the mortgaged properties, originally scheduled for 25 August 1986, was cancelled. After the lapse of the TRO, without any other injunction or restraining order having been issued, the Sheriff’s Office of the RTC of Balayan, Batangas, through Deputy Sheriff Edmundo M. Rodriguez, issued another Notice of Public Auction Sale setting the public auction of the mortgaged properties for 17 September 1986. The public auction proceeded as scheduled wherein the mortgaged properties were awarded to the highest bidder, CRBI,[11] for the following amounts:
(a) P111,806.05 for the properties of Estanislao Ilagan; and

(b) P19,295.82 for the properties of Alberto Urcia.
A Certificate of Sale was issued on the same day in favor of CRBI.

Respondents filed on 15 December 1986 Motions to Dismiss Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702.[12]

In an Order[13] issued on 23 December 1986, jointly resolving the two cases, RTC Executive Judge Alberto Reyes found the Motions to Dismiss meritorious and dismissed Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 for being moot and academic.

Aggrieved, petitioners in the two Special Civil Actions assailed the RTC Order dated 23 December 1986 via separate Petitions for Certiorari[14] filed with the Court of Appeals but these petitions were subsequently dismissed.[15]

From the appellate court’s dismissal of their petitions, petitioners sought recourse from this Court by filing Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition[16] which were granted. In a Resolution[17] dated 28 October 1987, this Court directed the RTC to proceed with the hearing of Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702, to determine whether there was indeed overpayment of the loan obligations of petitioners to CRBI.

Hence, the proceedings before the RTC in Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 resumed.

The RTC summarized the issues in Special Civil Action No. 1701 as follows:
(1) whether or not the numerous withdrawals on 21 December 1983 after the death of Estanislao Ilagan were valid withdrawals;

(2) whether or not the mortgaged properties were validly foreclosed on 17 September 1986;

(3) whether or not deceased Estanislao Ilagan and his heirs had fully paid its [sic] obligation to respondent.
In Special Civil Action No. 1702, the sole issue was whether or not Alberto’s loans had already been paid.

After nine years of trial, the RTC dismissed Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 for lack of merit. In a Decision dated 3 October 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of CRBI and found that the mortgaged properties were validly foreclosed on 17 September 1986. The RTC held:
WHEREFORE, petitioners instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.[18]
Petitioners filed a joint appeal with the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56688. On 19 July 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 56688 and affirmed the RTC Decision dated 3 October 1996. The Court of Appeals held:
Appellants contend that there was no need for the bank to foreclose the mortgage on the Urcia spouses’ property since it could run after either Teofila as co-maker or Rosario whose quedan was in the bank’s possession and is sufficient to pay the loans. The contention is untenable.

Art. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.� The choice of the solidary debtor or against whom the solidary creditor will enforce collection is left to the latter (PNB vs. Independent Planters Association, Inc., 122 SCRA 113). Similarly, the choice of remedy to effect collection pertains to the creditor. On the other hand, the bank cannot run after Rosario’s quedan because she is not indebted to it. The loan was exclusively obtained by Alberto. And Rosario did not assign her quedan to the bank as payment for Alberto’s obligations.

x x x x

x x x The death of the debtor does not extinguish his civil liability as his estate will answer for it (Art. 1078, Civil Code). Since the quedans belong to Estanislao, the proceeds thereof should be applied to his own obligation. In this sense, Estanislao can be considered a debtor of the bank, even after his death, concerning his unpaid loans.

x x x x

Considering the foregoing, appellants’ computation of Estanislao’s loans from the bank is, at best, sketchy and self-serving and renders the purported overpayment implausible.

Consequently, We uphold the court a quo’s finding that Estanislao is indebted to the bank in the amount of P67,000.00. As aptly observed by the trial court:

“The Central Bank Report speaks for itself. It was adopted by the petitioners as their own evidence and was marked as Exhibits ‘J’, ‘RRR-1’ to ‘RRR-3’. There is presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. And the Court finds the report of the Central Bank employees as regards the computation of the loans of the late Estanislao Ilagan to be correct.�

In fine, the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas (Balayan, Branch 10) is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[19] filed by petitioners in a Resolution[20] dated 6 February 2006.

Petitioners thus filed on 20 March 2006 this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
ISSUES FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 1701
WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON CAN VALIDLY CONTRACTED (sic) A LOAN AFTER HIS DEATH.

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOAN OBTAINED AFTER THE DEATH OF A PERSON WILL FORM PART OF HIS EXISTING OBLIGATION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE EXECUTED BY A DECEASED WILL COVER AN OBLIGATION INCURRED AFTER HIS DEATH.
ISSUES FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 1702
WHETHER OR NOT THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS IS VALID AFTER DETERMINING [sic] BY THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE WAS AN OVERPAYMENT OF OBLIGATION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT BANK CAN VALIDLY PROCEED WITH THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING THE DEPOSITS IN ITS POSSESSION UNDER THE NAME OF THE PETITIONERS IN PAYMENT OF THE UNPAID OBLIGATIONS.
Petitioners pray that a decision be rendered reversing the earlier Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 56688; declaring the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties in Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 as null and void; and ordering the return of the Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of the petitioners free from all liens and encumbrances.

Petitioners challenge the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages by CRBI for having been done with malice and bad faith.

Petitioners allege that Estanislao could not have possibly entered into a loan obligation after his death. He died on 23 August 1983. This is in accordance with Article 42 of the New Civil Code which provides that “civil personality is extinguished by death.� Thus, it would have been impossible for Estanislao to incur the loan obligation embodied in the promissory note dated 3 October 1984 for the sum of P44,000.00, and said promissory note should not have been included among Estanislao’s obligations.

Petitioners also maintain that the loan for P10,000.00, covered by promissory note dated 23 July 1985 executed by Alberto, with Teofila as co-maker, was already paid, thus, making the foreclosure of real estate mortgage securing the said loan null and void. If only CRBI submitted an accounting as petitioners requested, there would have been no more need to resort to the foreclosure proceedings since there was, in fact, an overpayment of P3,056.13 on the loan.[21]

Petitioners assert that the sheriffs and the trial and appellate courts failed to look into the existence and validity of the obligations secured by the mortgage properties that could have materially affected the foreclosure proceedings.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the real matter at issue is whether the separate loans contracted by Estanislao and Alberto still subsist as to make the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid; or, conversely, whether the loans were already paid, thus, making the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties null and void. They posit that these factual matters were already resolved by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in their favor. Thus, they argue that the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties was in order and, consequently, the present Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

Clearly, the real issue to be resolved is whether Estanislao and Alberto still had outstanding loan obligations with CRBI that would justify the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.

We rule in the affirmative, and find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law.[22] There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.[23] A question of law has been defined as one that does not call for any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[24]

We have consistently stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts. As such, it is not our function to re-examine every appreciation of facts made by the trial and appellate courts unless the evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts.[25]

As correctly observed by CRBI, the issues raised by petitioners are purely factual. It would entail a review and evaluation of the evidence that were already presented before the trial court.

Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case, are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court, for it is not the function of this Court to reexamine the lower courts’ findings of fact. Suffice it to say that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not generally be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances that would warrant a different disposition of the case.[26]

Admittedly, the above rule is not absolute, as it admits of certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioners are not disputed by the respondents, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [27]

Petitioners, however, have not shown that any of these circumstances are attendant herein for us to deviate from the general rule.

A mortgage is a mere accessory contract to the loan obligation, thus, the validity of the mortgage depends on the validity of the loan it is supposed to secure. The debtor cannot escape the consequences of the mortgage contract once the validity of the loan is upheld.[28] And when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, have the property seized and sold, and apply the proceeds to the balance of the loan obligation. Foreclosure is proper if the debtor is in default in the payment of his loan obligation.

In the Petition at bar, there is substantial evidence to support the facts that petitioners had existing loan obligations subject of Real Estate Mortgages executed in favor of CRBI and there was default on the payment thereof.

Special Civil Action No. 1701

It has been established by evidence on record that Estanislao obtained a total of 32 loans from the bank. Estanislao used the very same properties he mortgaged to secure his first loan in 1974 as collaterals for his subsequent loans. However, no corresponding entries on the constituted mortgages were made on TCTs No. 11234, 14493, 8465 and 18772, except that of the first loan contracted in 1974. As payments for these loans, Estanislao assigned to CRBI the proceeds from his sugar produce milled at CADP and BSCI. The said proceeds were applied to the principal, interests and charges of Estanislao’s loans.

Per the Central Bank Report, Estanislao still had loans left unpaid:
The rural bank collected from Estanislao Ilagan P678,848.24 which fully paid 30 of his 32 loan accounts thereby leaving 2 loans totaling P67,000 still unpaid (Annex II-A).[29]
Among the 32 loans charged against Estanislao by the CRBI is a loan in the amount of P44,000.00[30] covered by a promissory note dated 3 October 1984, more than a year after Estanislao’s death on 23 August 1983, and signed by Teofila, per testimony of Geminiano Noche.

Teofila and Rosario urge that the said loan should be excluded from the obligations secured by Estanislao’s four mortgaged properties.

While it is conceded that the promissory note for P44,000.00 was signed by Teofila from CRBI on 3 October 1984, or after the death of Estanislao, the circumstances and reasons for this are adequately explained to show that said amount represent existing loans of Estanislao contracted by him prior to his death.

First, during the RTC trial, the following testimony was elicited from Geminiano Noche:
Estanislao died in August 1983. According to witness, he allowed Teofila Ilagan to sign the Promissory Note dated 3 October 1984, because the collateral on the loan is a property in the name of Estanislao Ilagan and because Teofila so requested since it would take time to settle the estate of Estanislao Ilagan and inasmuch as she would inherit the property.[31] (Emphasis ours.)
Secondly, Teofila and Rosario were definite in their petition in Special Civil Action No. 1701 when they were deemed to have admitted therein that Estanislao was required to sign promissory notes in blank for the renewal of the unpaid balances of the original loans, which procedure was followed after Estanislao died on August 1983, but this time thru Teofila.

Based on the foregoing, it can be established that the Promissory Note dated 3 October 1984 then, although signed after the death of Estanislao on 23 August 1983, reflect an unpaid balance on the loans obtained by Estanislao from CRBI prior to his death, and secured by the same properties used as collaterals by him since he obtained the first loan in 1974.

Hence, payment for said loan, upon default, can be collected by CRBI by foreclosing on the mortgaged properties.

Teofila and Rosario then raised another point by contending that withdrawals were fraudulently made from Estanislao’s CRBI Savings Account No. 5659 on 21 December 1983, after his death. A study of the testimony of Teofila reveals that Estanislao maintained four passbooks with CRBI, to wit:
Savings Account No. 1382, under the name of Estanislao Ilagan and/or Teofila Ilagan;

Savings Account No. 5659, under the name Teofila Ilagan and/or Estanislao Ilagan

Savings Account No. 5659, under the name of Estanislao Ilagan

Savings Account No. 5659, under the name Estanislao Ilagan and/or Teofila Ilagan
Estanislao’s passbook for Savings Account No. 5659 contained entries of withdrawals made on 21 December 1983, which Estanislao could no longer have made after his death. If the withdrawals are invalidated, then the fraudulently withdrawn amounts could be returned to Estanislao’s account and applied against the balance of his loans, which could even result in overpayment.

Julita Marasigan, a former cashier of the bank, testified on the bank procedure with respect to withdrawals made in the bank. We find that the entries in Savings Account No. 5659, in the name of Estanislao, made on 21 December 1983, after his death, were made in good faith and did not represent withdrawals made on such date, but on previous dates, when Estanislao was still alive. Julita Marasigan explained that it is the standard operating procedure of CRBI to allow withdrawals even without the client presenting the passbook. The passbook is updated only later on with the appropriate entries once it is presented to CRBI.

This was further corroborated by CRBI President Germiniano Noche, who testified as follows:Q: It appears on this page of Exhibit B that there were several withdrawals made on December 31, 1983. Will you please tell us how could these withdrawals been made?

A: These withdrawals were in accordance with the standard procedure of the bank when there is an up-dating.



Q: What do you mean by “up-dating�?



A: By “up-dating,� before December 21 comes, the client go (sic) to the bank without the passbook.



Q: What did the client do without the passbook?

A: Requesting the bank in order for her to withdraw.



Q: And was the withdrawal allowed?



A: Because of the good relationship between the client and the bank, we allowed the withdrawal without the passbook.



Q: So these withdrawals made on December 21, 1983, to which withdrawal this refers?

A: This refers to withdrawal before December 21, 1983.



Q: How come that the withdrawal had entered only on December 21, 1983?

A: That had been entered only on December 21, 1983 because the representative of the client arrived on that date with the passbook.



Q: By “client�, to whom are you referring to?



A: Estanislao Ilagan and Teofila Ilagan.



Q: Mr. Noche, according to the petition, Mr. Estanislao Ilagan died sometime in August, 1983. Now, according to you, she went to the bank on December 21, 1983. Will you please tell us how come Mr. Estanislao Ilagan was able to go to the bank on December 21, 1983?



ATTY. AGUJO:



Objection, you Honor. In the previous question, your Honor Mr. witness stated that Mr. Estanislao Ilagan and Teofila Ilagan. Then the next question your Honor has a conflict because the line of questioning, it appears that it was only Ms. Ilagan by using the word “she�, your Honor.



COURT:



What is the question?



ATTY. CABAL:



Q: My question is: How come Mr. Estanislao Ilagan was able to go to the bank on December 21, 1983 while he died in August 1983?



COURT: May answer.



A: If there is no Estanislao Ilagan, then there (sic) Teofila Ilagan because this is “and/or�.



Q: What is the meaning of “and/or�?



A: We can enter transaction to the passbook either the daughter or the father.[32]

Witnesses for CRBI have thus sufficiently explained the circumstances behind the withdrawals entered on Estanislao’s passbook even after his death.

Teofila and Rosario failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the entries made on the passbook of Estanislao were regular and speak of the correct transactions made by the parties therein.[33]

Special Civil Action No. 1702.

The evidence on record reveals that Alberto has two unpaid loans with CRBI, particularly:
(a) loan in the amount of P10,000, covered by promissory note dated 23 July 1985, which would fall due on 19 April 1986; and

(b) loan in the amount of P8,200.00, covered by promissory note dated 23 December 1985, which would fall due on 19 September 1986.
The Central Bank Reports submitted establish an overpayment[34] by Alberto in the amount of P3,056.13 to CRBI. However, page 2 of Central Bank Memorandum[35] dated 1 October 1986 reads:
(a) Alberto Urcia paid to the bank P96,054.23 which fully paid 10 of his 12 loans thereby leaving 2 loans totaling P18,200 still unpaid (Annex I-A)

(b) The bank charged Mr. Urcia attorney’s fees of P1,403.17 instead of P1,2221.15 or an overcharge of P182.02 (Annex I-A)

(c) The rural bank made a net overcharge in interest of P2,874.11. (Annex I-A)[36]
Jose Galit, Central Bank Examiner, testified that in computing the overpayment of P3,056.13 by Alberto, his second loan of P8,200.00 was not yet included therein:Q: Now, I invite your attention to page two of the report which was marked as Exhibit A-1 and on the findings of the Central Bank, your department Alberto Urcia, the respondent stated and I quote “the bank charged xxx� (Please see Exhibit “A-1� record). If you total this amount the sum would be P3,056.13. Now Annex “1� of that report which was marked as Exhibit “A-5� for the following findings of your Department and I quote “Between the petitioner from November 18, 1980 to December 20, 1985, complaint was xxx� (NOTE: please see Exhibit “A-4� on record). Second, date granted December 23, 1985, date due, September 18, 1986. Amount P8,200.00. When you computed the alleged overcharge of P3,056.13, did you consider this (sic) outstanding loans of petitioners Alberto Urcia?



A: No, sir.

Q: What do you mean by that?



A: Because that overcharged (sic) pertains to different loans.



Q: What was the status of loan of Alberto Urcia as of June 12, 1986?



A: The two (2) loans were unpaid as of examination.[37]12345

A more thorough review of the Central Bank Report would disclose that the supposed overpayment refers to Alberto’s other loans with CRBI, leaving two loans amounting to P18,000.00 with the same bank still unpaid.

The testimony of Jose Galit, taken together with the Central Bank Reports, indicate that the principal amounts pertaining to Alberto’s two outstanding loans, totaling P18,200.00, plus interests and other charges thereon, exceed the P3,056.13 overpayment on his other loans with CRBI. Thus, Alberto is still indebted to CRBI for the principal, interest, and other charges on the said two loans, less the overpaid amount of P3,056.13 on his other loans.

Alberto further argues that while his loan matured on 19 September 1986, the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. 31345 was foreclosed two days earlier, on 17 September 1986. It must be stressed, however, that Alberto Urcia had two unpaid loans with CRBI: one, for P10,000.00, which matured on 19 April 1986; the other, for P8,200.00, which became due on 19 September 1986.

Alberto insists that the real property covered by TCT No. 32345 stands as security for the two loans, implying that the obligations are indivisible. We are not persuaded. The documents show that the loans were obtained and set to mature on two different dates. They are obviously separate and distinct from each other although secured by the same property. CRBI may collect payment on the loans as each falls due. CRBI resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgaged property when Alberto failed to pay his P10,000.00 loan which became due on 19 April 1986. CRBI apparently did not yet move to collect on Alberto’s P8,200.00 loan which, at that time, had not matured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., Assigned as Special Member.


[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-45.

[2] Penned by Judge Elino A. Ybanez; Rollo, pp. 112-147.

[3] Rollo, p. 60.

[4] The same title serves as collateral for a 23 December 1983 loan due to mature on 18 September 1986; rollo, p. 62.

[5] Rollo, pp. 65-74.

[6] See Petition in Special Civil Action No. 1701.

[7] Rollo, pp. 66-67.

[8] Id. at 67.

[9] Id. at 75-80.

[10] Id. at 69.

[11] The Minutes of the Auction Sale prepared by the Deputy Sheriff on 18 September 1986.

[12] Rollo, pp. 102-103.

[13] Issued by Executive Judge Alberto A. Reyes; rollo, pp. 104-106.

[14] CA-G.R. SP Nos. 11227-11230.

[15] 1 April 1987; records, Vol. I, pp. 161-167.

[16] G.R. Nos. 77480-77481.

[17] a) to proceed immediately with the hearing of Special Civil Action Nos. 1701 and 1072, particularly, to determine whether petitioners have overpaid their obligations to private respondent bank.

b) to cause without any delay, the registration of a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of the parcels of land sold at the auction sale held on 17 September 1986 until final termination of said Special Civil Actions. x x x. (Records, Vol. I, p. 154.)

[18] Rollo, p. 147.

[19] Id. at 47-58.

[20] Id. at 59.

[21] Respondent Bank already has in its possession the quedans of Petitioners Urcia in the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00).

[22] Section 1, Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court.

[23] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 156, 171 (2000) citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224, 232.

[24] Philippine National Bank v. Norman Pike, G.R. No. 157845, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 328, 339-340.

[25] Fortuna v. People, 401 Phil. 545, 550 (2000).

[26] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 565 (1999).

[27] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.

[28] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138703, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 25, 46.

[29] The total amount collected includes interest and other charges.

[30] Evidenced by promissory note dated 3 October 1984.

[31] Rollo, p. 134.

[32] TSN, 22 November 1994, pp. 20-23.

[33] Presumption of regularity.

[34] Folder of Exhibits, Exh. J.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] TSN, 1 December 1993, pp. 97-98.

SOLID HOMES, INC., Petitioner, vs. EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F. CRUZ, Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166051, April 08, 2008]

SOLID HOMES, INC., Petitioner, vs. EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F. CRUZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the Decision[1] dated 21 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, which denied and dismissed the Petition filed before it by the petitioner for lack of merit; and (2) the Resolution[2] dated 10 November 2004 of the same court, which denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell[3] with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid upon the signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.88[4] was payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977. The respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The same was docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-073090-4511. In their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount. The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer,[5] together with its Answer[6] dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

On 7 October 1992, HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a Decision[7] denying respondents’ prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the TCT. He, however, directed the petitioner to execute and deliver the aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the moment that the purchase price is fully settled by the respondents. Further, he ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the respondents other than those authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957[8] and similar statutes.[9]

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed[10] the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The case was then docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-A-1298.

On 10 August 1994, the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a Decision,[11] modifying the 7 October 1992 Decision of HLURB Arbiter Dean. The decretal portion of the Board’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [D]ecision of [HLURB] Arbiter Gerardo Dean dated 07 October 1992 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
[Herein respondent][12] is hereby directed to pay the balance of P11,585.41 within the (sic) thirty (30) days from finality of this [D]ecision.

[Herein petitioner] is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full payment.

[Petitioner] is hereby directed to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees other than those authorized by P.D. 957 and other related laws. [13] (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus, it appealed the same before the Office of the President, wherein it was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5919.

After evaluating the established facts and pieces of evidence on record, the Office of the President rendered a Decision[14] dated 10 June 2003, affirming in toto the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the President merely adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

Resultantly, petitioner moved for the reconsideration[15] of the 10 June 2003 Decision of the Office of the President. However, in an Order[16] dated 9 December 2003, the Office of the President denied the same.

The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under Rule 43[17] of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, raising the following issues, to wit: (1) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in merely adopting by reference the findings and conclusions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners in arriving at the questioned [D]ecision; and (2) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.[18]

On 21 July 2004, the appellate court rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the petitioner’s Petition for Review for lack of merit, thus affirming the Decision of the Office of the President dated 10 June 2003, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant [P]etition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.[19] (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but, it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 10 November 2004.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHICH MERELY ADOPTS BY REFERENCE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE [HLURB], IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE DECISION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND LAW TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION; AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS LACKS CAUSE OF ACTION.[20]
In its Memorandum,[21] the petitioner alleges that the Decision of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which merely adopted by reference the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts and law on which it was based, runs afoul of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.� The Office of the President, being a government agency, should have adhered to this principle.

Petitioner further avers that a full exposition of the facts and the law upon which a decision was based goes to the very essence of due process as it is intended to inform the parties of the factual and legal considerations employed to support a decision. The same was not complied with by the Office of the President when it rendered its one-page Decision dated 10 June 2003. Without a complete statement in the judgment of the facts proven, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issues in the case, inasmuch as when the facts are not supported by evidence, it is impossible to administer justice to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Complaint filed against it by the respondents stated no cause of action because the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property. The right of action of the respondents to file a case with the HLURB would only accrue once they have fulfilled their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for the subject property. Hence, the respondents’ Complaint against the petitioner should have been dismissed outright by the HLURB for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

The constitutional mandate that, “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,�[22] does not preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions,� which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.[23] In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court has sanctioned the use of “memorandum decisions,� a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40,[25] B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,[26] on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that “memorandum decisions� comply with the constitutional mandate.[27]

This Court found in Romero v. Court of Appeals[28] that the Court of Appeals substantially complied with its constitutional duty when it adopted in its Decision the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
“We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision.� (Underscoring supplied)
In Francisco v. Permskul,[29] this Court similarly held that the following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1997 Philippine Constitution:
“MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

“WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.� (Underscoring supplied.)
Hence, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.[30]

However, also in Permskul,[31] this Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, to wit:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

x x x x

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.[32]
In the case at bar, we quote verbatim the Decision dated 10 June 2003 of the Office of the President which adopted by reference the Decision dated 10 August 1994 of the HLURB Board of Commissioners:
This resolves the appeal filed by [herein petitioner] Solid Homes, Inc. from the [D]ecision of the [HLURB] dated [10 August 1994].

After a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the case, this Office is convinced by the findings of the HLURB, thus we find no cogent reason to depart from the assailed [D]ecision. Therefore, we hereby adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the aforesaid [D]ecision, copy of which is hereto attached as “Annex A.�

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[33] (Emphasis supplied).
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled “Judiciary,� and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied.[34] In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.[35]

As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;� and that the decision be rendered “in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.� Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the President need not comply with the constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find application, although suppletory only in character and apply only whenever practicable and convenient. There is no mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.

Even assuming arguendo that the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner applies in the instant case, the decision of the OP satisfied the standards set forth in the case of Permskul.

Firstly, the Decision of the Office of the President readily made available to the parties a copy of the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted and affirmed in toto, because it was attached as an annex to its Decision.

Secondly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Board of Commissioners have been embodied in the Decision of the Office of the President and made an indispensable part thereof. With the attachment of a copy of the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Decision of the Office of the President, the parties reading the latter can also directly access the factual and legal findings adopted from the former. As the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in its Decision dated 21 July 2004, “the facts narrated and the laws concluded in the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners should be considered as written in the Decision of the Office of the President. It was still easy for the parties to determine the facts and the laws on which the decision were based. Moreover, through the attached decision, the parties could still identify the issues that could be appealed to the proper tribunal.�[36]

Thirdly, it was categorically stated in the Decision of the Office of the President that it conducted a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the present case and it was fully convinced as regards the findings of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

And lastly, the facts of the present case were not contested by the parties and it can be easily determined by the hearing officer or tribunal. Even the respondents admitted that, indeed, the total purchase price for the subject property has not yet been fully settled and the outstanding balance is yet to be paid by them. In addition, this case is a simple action for specific performance with damages, thus, there are neither doctrinal complications involved in this case that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.

Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Office of the President did not violate petitioner’s right to due process when it rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in its case.

This Court also quotes with approval the following declaration of the Court of Appeals in its Decision on the alleged violation of petitioner’s right to due process:
The contention of the [herein] petitioner that the said [D]ecision runs afoul to the Constitutional provision on due process cannot be given credence. The case already had gone through the Offices of the HLURB Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners where petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and present its evidence, before the case reached the Office of the President which rendered the assailed [D]ecision after a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented. What is important is that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before the [D]ecision was rendered. To nullify the assailed [D]ecision would in effect be a violation of the Constitution because it would deny the parties of the right to speedy disposition of cases.[37]
Petitioner’s assertion that respondents’ complaint filed with the HLURB lacked a cause of action deserves scant consideration.

Section 7 of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure states that:
Section 7. Dismissal of the Complaint or Opposition. – The Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA) to whom a complaint or opposition is assigned may immediately dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction or cause of action. (Emphasis supplied).
It is noticeable that the afore-quoted provision of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure used the word “may� instead of “shall,� meaning, that the dismissal of a complaint or opposition filed before the HLURB Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action is simply permissive and not directive. The HLURB Arbiter has the discretion of whether to dismiss immediately the complaint or opposition filed before him for lack of jurisdiction or cause of action, or to still proceed with the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence. HLURB Arbiter Dean in his Decision explained thus:
This Office is well aware of instances when complainants/petitioners fail, through excusable negligence, to incorporate every pertinent allegations (sic) necessary to constitute a cause of action. We will not hesitate to go outside of the complaint/petition and consider other available evidences if the same is necessary to a judicious, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the issues laid before us or when there are reasons to believe that the [com]plaints are meritorious. “Administrative rules should be construed liberally in order to PROMOTE THEIR OBJECT AND ASSIST THE PARTIES IN OBTAINING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES� (Mangubat vs. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608).[38] (Emphasis supplied).
Given the fact that the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiter’s discretion to proceed hearing the respondents’ complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the parties’ claims and defenses.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals already sufficiently addressed the issue of lack of cause of action in its Decision, viz:
The Offices below, instead of dismissing the complaint because of the clear showing that there was no full payment of the purchase price, decided to try the case and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The complaint of the respondents does not totally lack cause of action because of their right against the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of their payments due to non-payment of their monthly amortization.

xxxx

The HLURB Arbiter in his [D]ecision, stated that it is undisputed that the contract price is not yet fully paid. This was affirmed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President. No less than the respondents admitted such fact when they contended that they are willing to pay their unpaid balance. Without full payment, the respondents have no right to compel the petitioner to execute the Deed of Sale and deliver the title to the property. xxx.

xxxx

Lastly, notwithstanding such failure to pay the monthly amortization, the petitioner cannot consider the contract as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited.

Section 24, PD 957 provides:
“Section 24. Failure to pay installments. - The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than the failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552. x x x.�
Section 4, RA 6552 or the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act provides:
“Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.�
It is therefore clear from the above provisions that the petitioner cannot consider the [C]ontract to [S]ell as cancelled. The requirements above should still be complied with.[39] (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, during the hearing conducted by HLURB Arbiter Dean, it became apparent that respondents’ cause of action against petitioner is not limited to the non-execution and non-delivery by petitioner of the Deed of Sale and TCT of the subject property, which is dependent on their full payment of the purchase price thereof; but also the wrongful rescission by the petitioner of the Contract to Sell. By virtue thereof, there is ample basis for HLURB Arbiter Dean not to dismiss respondents’ complaint against petitioner and continue hearing and resolving the case.

As a final point. Based on the records of this case, respondents have tendered payment in the amount of P11,584.41,[40] representing the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, as determined in the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals. However, the petitioner, without any justifiable reason, refused to accept the same. In Ramos v. Sarao,[41] this Court held that tender of payment is the manifestation by debtors of their desire to comply with or to pay their obligation. If the creditor refuses the tender of payment without just cause, the debtors are discharged from the obligation by the consignation of the sum due. Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount with the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with these requisites is mandatory.[42] In the case at bar, after the petitioner refused to accept the tender of payment made by the respondents, the latter failed to make any consignation of the sum due. Consequently, there was no valid tender of payment and the respondents are not yet discharged from the obligation to pay the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the subject property.

Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Tinga, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.


* Assigned as Special Member.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring, rollo, pp. 10-17.

[2] Id. at 20-21.

[3] Id. at 44-47.

[4] The remaining balance of P166,421.88 was inclusive of 12% interest rate per annum. The said 12% interest rate per annum was payable monthly to be included in the monthly amortization for a period of three years. Thus, the P4,622.83 monthly installments were already inclusive of the said interest [Section 1, Contract to Sell, rollo, p. 44].

[5] Id. at 48-49.

[6] Id. at 50.

[7] Penned by HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean, id. at 69-76.

[8] Otherwise known as “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree.� It was signed into law on 12 July 1976.

[9] Rollo, p. 76.

[10] Id. at 77.

[11] Penned by Commissioner Luis T. Tungpalan, with Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer Ernesto C. Mendiola and Assistant Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Ex-Officio Commissioner Joel L. Altea, concurring, id. at 95-98.

[12] It should be “herein respondents� [the complainants below]. In the dispositive part of the Board’s Decision, what was written was “complainant is hereby…� But, a careful reading of the Board’s Decision would show that there was more than one complainant in the Complaint filed before the HLURB.

[13] Rollo, p. 98.

[14] Penned by Undersecretary Enrique D. Perez, id. at 99-103.

[15] Id. at 104-106.

[16] Id. at 107-108.

[17] Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.

[18] Rollo, p. 114.

[19] Id. at 17.

[20] Id. at 197-198.

[21] Id. at 191-206.

[22] Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

[23] Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 26, 44.

[24] G.R. No. 132428, 24 October 2000, 344 SCRA 202.

[25] SEC. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.

[26] Also known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.�

[27] Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 216.

[28] No. L-59606, 8 January 1987, 147 SCRA 183.

[29] G.R. No. 81006, 12 May 1989, 173 SCRA 324, 326.

[30] Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 44-45.

[31] Francisco v. Permskul, supra note 29 at 335-337.

[32] Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 217.

[33] Rollo, p. 99.

[34] Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

[35] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[36] Id. at 14.

[37] Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[38] Id. at 72-73.

[39] Id. at 15-17.

[40] Id. at 231-232.

[41] G.R. No. 149756, 11 February 2005, 451 SCRA 103, 118-119.

[42] Id.